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Introduction: wrongful convictions, procedural traditions and 
cultural trust  
 
In this article we seek to assess the significance of what we term ‘cultural 
trust’ in relation to wrongful convictions in England and Wales and the 
Netherlands, in the light of the adversarial and inquisitorial procedural 
traditions which still underpin criminal process in the two countries. 
International surveys identify many similarities across jurisdictions from 
both traditions in the direct causes of miscarriages of justice: abuse of 
power, mistaken eyewitnesses, dubious or misunderstood expert evidence 
and diverse professional failures by judges, defence lawyers, police 
and/or prosecutors (Huff and Killias 2008, 2013). More broadly, there is 
evidence of the effect of the general psychological phenomenon, also 
well-known from experimental research, confirmation bias or tunnel 
vision. This suggests that information is filtered through an established 
lens. Where we have a pre-existing view about the facts (for example a 
suspect’s guilt) we do not deal symmetrically with subsequent 
information. We tend to seek to confirm our pre-existing hypothesis and 
have difficulty in ‘seeing’ – or seeing the significance of – facts pointing to 
alternative explanations (Brants 2013: 163-6). This has been a key factor 
in the story behind miscarriages of justice in many jurisdictions. 
While there are clearly many similarities in the particular underlying 
causes of wrongful convictions and in general psychological effects in 
play, a comparative study focussed on procedural traditions can 
nevertheless be fruitful. Jurisdictions from the adversarial and inquisitorial 
traditions differ significantly in the guarantees that each offers against 
wrongful conviction in terms of expectations in professional conduct, in 
ways of assessing and responding to potentially misleading and 
problematic evidence, and thus also in the definition of the roles and 
relationships of professional actors. These key differences are linked to 
different underlying theories as to how facts and truth are to be found. 
Sometimes these concepts of truth-finding – or at least elements of them 
– are explicitly stated in policy documents and legislation.1 But often they 
are set out, if at all, only in fragmented or incomplete terms and have to 
be at least partly constructed by identifying the underlying assumptions of 
the particular procedural tradition.  
For jurisdictions primarily influenced by the inquisitorial tradition, 
the emphasis has been on the active truth-finding judge and the dossier. 
Thus in the Netherlands, a thorough investigation supervised by an 
impartial prosecutor2 with the resulting evidence both for and against 
guilt recorded in an official file, is assumed to provide an active fact-
finding judge with the capacity to find truth at trial. Within the adversarial 
tradition in England and Wales, autonomous party rights to collect the 
evidence that suits their case are said to provide a basis for strong 
defence narrative building and the opportunity to effectively challenge 
prosecution witnesses at trial through cross-examination. This allows the 
equality of arms in argument at trial upon which accurate adversarial 
fact-finding is thought to depend.  
But because such underlying assumptions are linked to a particular 
procedural tradition they have accumulated normative weight over time. 
As H Patrick Glenn has put it (2010: 17):  
‘That which has been captured from the past is inherently 
normative; it provides present lessons as to how we should act…The 
                                                      
11 For example, Art 81, French CCP on the duties of the examining magistrate to seek 
out both exculpatory and inculpatory evidence. 
2 Originally this would have been an investigating judge comparable to the French juge 
d’instruction. 
judgment of many, down through time, confers authority, even 
legitimacy – at least presumptively – on the lessons of tradition.’ 
 
So these are not just assumptions into which individual practitioners have 
been socialized and by which particular professional lives have been lived. 
The legitimacy of long established collective practice is rooted in them.  
One way of expressing this is in terms of cultural trust: different 
jurisdictions have their own particular and critical points of trust where 
fundamental assumptions are made upon which the fact-finding capacity 
of the system is based. These points of cultural trust are rooted in what 
are perceived within the jurisdiction to be traditional strengths. However, 
these may become points of weakness when the assumptions upon which 
they are built no longer correspond to reality. What if the investigation in 
the Netherlands is neither thorough nor impartial, the dossier is 
incomplete and the judge unwilling or unable to fulfil an active role? And 
what if the defence in England and Wales in fact lack the capacity or will 
to conduct active independent pre-trial investigations? Here cultural trust 
can be damaging because it may prevent acknowledging weaknesses 
where this contradicts established wisdom. Furthermore, the assumptions 
of a particular procedural tradition, while not excluding change, may also 
make it difficult to think through or accept new ways of constructing roles 
and relationships within criminal justice where this runs contrary to what 
have come to appear as self-evident truths. This may make it more 
difficult to reform systems coherently even where serious miscarriages of 
justice have been acknowledged as being based on recurring problems.  
It may seem counterintuitive to emphasize trust as potentially 
dangerous, because it is generally seen as a positive, indeed essential, 
element in social relations in that it both expresses and reflects stability in 
mutual expectations.  Rasmus Wandall argues (2015: 285-6) that from a 
functional point of view, trust can be described as a remedy for the 
inevitable uncertainty of social life – of what to expect from other people, 
groups, institutions, or from whole systems. But we also talk about 
‘taking something on trust’ to identify a situation where we assume 
something to be true without (sufficient) evidence. And in criminal 
matters abusing trust leads to aggravated sentences exactly because it 
exploits vulnerability, often a vulnerability generated by established 
expectations of a person or a role (Ashworth 2015: 173). 
If the vulnerability created by trust is linked to established 
expectations, then comparative analysis illustrates how expectations and 
trust are culturally contingent. David Nelken emphasizes the importance 
of examining ‘decisions to trust, whom to trust, and the consequences of 
trusting’ in comparing the legal, political and cultural relations of different 
criminal justice systems (1994 cited by Wandall, op. cit.: 286). Trust 
relationships, he argues, are integrated in the design of criminal justice, 
in ‘its purposes and functions, its institutional settings and structures of 
accountability, the limits of criminalisation and legal authority, as well as 
the balance between state and non-state social control’. Wandall also 
urges us to see mechanisms of trust as part of the ‘governing structures 
of criminal justice’ (op. cit. at 304). Specifically, the way in which 
functional boundaries of different systems are set up creates (and limits) 
normative expectations of criminal justice institutions and thus structures 
the trust relationship between the public and those institutions. So, for 
Wandall, trust relations are not just about institutional ability to ensure 
trust but also reflect what criminal justice institutions want to be 
entrusted to do and not to do. Our argument is that the different 
procedural traditions of the Netherlands and England and Wales create 
such strong particular cultural expectations that practitioners find it 
difficult to recognise where they do not correspond to realities on the 
ground. Furthermore, these differing assumptions limit the scope of 
alternative arrangements that may be contemplated.  
In what follows, we will set out a general account of the relationship 
between truth-finding and the adversarial and inquisitorial procedural 
traditions before examining first England and Wales and then the 
Netherlands. We will seek to identify points within each jurisdiction where 
cultural trust is placed in the capacity of particular roles and relationships 
to ensure that the innocent are not convicted. But we will also argue that 
wrongful convictions in both jurisdictions demonstrate that these 
underlying assumptions may not correspond to realities on the ground. In 
a final section we will show how even the response to wrongful 
convictions, both individually and in terms of institutional reform, remains 
profoundly shaped (and indeed limited) by established procedural 
traditions.  
 
 
Truth-finding and procedural traditions 
 
Modern social theory has challenged the notion that there is an objective 
reality out there waiting to be found, arguing that truth is always socially 
contingent, constructed in language or discourse, variable between and 
even within cultures (Lyotard 1984). One could argue that criminal trials 
cannot and therefore should not aspire to produce truth: ‘the truth of 
what happened is probably unknowable’ (Goodpaster 1987: 124). While 
this might be consonant with the more thorough going scepticism of some 
modern social theory, it does not seem to be reflected in the way the 
official and public discourse is constructed in either the Netherlands or 
England and Wales.  
The overriding objective of the Criminal Procedure Rules 2015 in 
England and Wales (originally adopted in 2005) is to ensure that criminal 
cases are dealt with justly. Notions of ‘justice’ within the adversarial 
context are closely related to the procedural arrangements that ensure a 
fair trial (i.e. a trial that allows for debate and contestation on an equal 
footing). Nevertheless, the first named element of this pursuit of justice – 
placed even before aspirations to fairness of procedure or the recognition 
of the rights and legitimate interests of individual parties – is exactly 
‘acquitting the innocent and convicting the guilty’.3 The Dutch Code of 
Criminal Procedure (CCP) does not explicitly state that the primary goal of 
criminal process is to discover the truth. Dutch inquisitorial process is 
rooted in the civil law tradition of continental Europe, considering the 
state as fundamental to the realization of the ‘common good’. This entails 
not just preventing and investigating crime and punishing criminals but 
also protecting individual rights from undue interference by the state (the 
latter derived from society’s interest in due process and therefore seen as 
transcending that of the individual defendant) (Damaska, 1986; C. 
Brants, 2010). That the aims of criminal procedure include discovering 
the substantive truth is self-evident in this context – anything less would 
be to overlook a priori the fundamental duality of the role of the state. 
Consequently, what happens during the trial is commonly referred to (also 
in the CCP) as waarheidsvinding – truth-finding. Where such words are 
common usage, they denote what people and scholars understand criminal 
procedure to be about, without it ever being, or having to be, made 
explicit in law.  
 The very term ‘substantive truth’ assumes that there is a truth to 
be found, not different versions of it to be debated and from which to 
choose. Indeed, Dutch legal scholars regularly contrast the ‘substantive 
truth’ that is assumed to be found in the Netherlands with the ‘formal’ or 
‘procedural’ truth of adversarial procedure, presuming the latter to be 
simply an agreement on what can be regarded as the truth – and also 
presuming that, in the adversarial context, it doesn’t matter whether it is 
or not.4 This is a misconception shaped by entrenched cultural notions of 
what ‘the truth’ should be and how it best be found. Both jurisdictions 
assume that the rules of criminal procedure will lead to the truth being 
discovered and both have the dictum that any error should be on the side 
of acquitting the guilty, not convicting the innocent. It is simply that there 
                                                      
3 Criminal Procedure Rules 2015, Para 1.1.2 
4 For the use of a similar distinction between substantive and interpretive truth, see 
Grande (2008: 147-8) 
are important differences both in the way truth-finding is conceived and 
its relationship with other goals such as fairness in procedure. 
In the adversarial tradition, the right of autonomous parties to seek 
out the evidence that suits their case under conditions of something 
approaching equality of investigative arms and the requirement that 
evidence be presented orally at trial and subjected to challenge by cross-
examination are seen as key elements of Anglo-American due process. 
This culturally specific notion of fair procedure is also thought to provide 
the way to the truth, because confrontation between contending 
arguments is thought to put a passive and impartial decision-maker in the 
best position to determine guilt or innocence. Whether the underlying 
theory of truth-finding through partisan contention is valid and whether 
the practical conditions required can be regularly achieved in modern 
jurisdictions (Jackson, 1988), is at present not the issue. At this point we 
merely want to emphasize the difference between this commitment to 
truth-finding that emerges out of a particular notion of procedural fairness 
and the inquisitorial tradition, where the primary and original goal of the 
criminal justice system is determined by entrusting the state with the 
mission of directly searching for the truth. Here investigations both in the 
pre-trial and trial phases must be supervised by judicial figures 
committed to actively seeking out evidence both for and against the 
accused. The dossier provides continuity between pre-trial and trial 
phases: the results of the pre-trial investigation that has been actively 
supervised by the pre-trial investigating or prosecuting magistrate are 
placed in a dossier that becomes the basis for further judicial questioning 
at trial.  
However, the commitment to truth-finding, be it explicit or simply 
‘understood’ and however encapsulated procedurally, is provisional and 
restricted: it is not the pursuit of some absolute truth and the 
commitment is not unconditional. The notion of truth is shaped and 
limited by the distinct purposes, concepts and procedures of criminal 
justice in a particular jurisdiction. Furthermore, requirements of finality, 
limited investment of means and the distinct normative claims of fair 
procedure all cut across the primary commitment. Nevertheless, few 
events are more disturbing to the perceived legitimacy of criminal justice 
in either the Netherlands or England and Wales than a public 
acknowledgement that a citizen has been convicted of a serious offence 
that they did not commit.  
So, how are we to assess the strengths and weaknesses of these 
two very different approaches to truth-finding? If we think of modern 
scientific practice as the most prestigious and elaborate attempt to 
ground truth-finding in rational discourse, both approaches seem to have 
potential strengths and weaknesses. Jackson (op. cit; Brants and Field 
1995) points out that 20th century accounts of scientific method have 
rejected the Enlightenment notion of the scientist as an external and 
objective observer assiduously gathering facts from sense experience and 
only then forming a hypothesis for testing.5 It is now acknowledged that 
scientists do not operate according to this allegedly value-neutral 
method: observation and classification of even the most basic pieces of 
evidence implies an already existing theory by which to categorise. 
Scientists start not with certain fixed data but with a theory which they 
intuitively sense is promising and which points them to certain questions. 
If the answers do not fit the theory, they refine the theory to fit the new 
data. It is dialogue or dialectic between data and theory that validates 
scientific truth. This scientific dialogue is always ongoing – indeed never-
ending – because it is conducted within an academic community in which 
different researchers continue to advance differing accounts of the 
relationship between data and theory. But that is exactly why it can only 
ever produce a provisional truth.  
In this light, the strength of the adversarial tradition is its 
institutionalization of dialogue and challenge to offered accounts of the 
                                                      
5 William Twining’s work on the ‘rationalist tradition’ of evidence scholarship has also 
argued for the need to adapt that tradition in the light of 20th century accounts of the 
scientific method (Twining 2006).  
truth. Its weakness is that modern scientific practices presuppose a 
continuing dialogue between data collection and the conceptual 
framework for understanding that data: the latter refined in the light of 
new data and the refinements requiring further data collection to retest 
the modified hypothesis. But within the classical adversarial account, 
autonomous partisan parties seek out evidence which suits their case in 
the pre-trial phase; the fact-finding magistrate or jury only appears at 
trial (after the investigation is concluded) and is confined to a passive 
role. Here, nobody has the role of testing hypotheses about truth by 
commissioning or conducting further investigations. Thus the most 
obvious theoretical incompatibility with a modern model of scientific 
dialogue is the absence of an active pre-trial truth finding figure.  
It is classical inquisitorial process that has, at least in theory, this 
advantage of an active truth-finder both before and during trial, with the 
power to commission or conduct investigations to test hypotheses about 
guilt. But the obvious query, relative to the account of scientific fact-
finding, is whether there are adequate mechanisms to promote the 
ongoing dialogue between data and theory upon which it depends. In 
other words, are doubt and reflective analysis organising principles in the 
pre-trial investigation? In part this is a question about the culture 
underpinning judicial supervision: is there a strong, continuing 
commitment to dialogue and dialectic as a means of verifying truth?  
Bostjan Zupancic suggests we should view the lone but active truth-
finder, at least in criminal process, with some suspicion. All investigators, 
prosecutors, examining magistrates or police officers, must of necessity 
form hypotheses to provide criteria of relevance: the unfocussed 
assembling of disparate facts could hardly be called an investigation. 
What Zupanic sees as crucial to truth-finding is not absence of a 
preconceived hypothesis but flexibility in changing it, or the presence of 
more than one hypothesis. This suggests the need for institutionalized 
means of counter-argument and counter-interpretation. Further, Zupancic 
argues that distinctive features of the structure of criminal investigations 
suggest the importance of dialogue between parties. The initial hypothesis 
to be tested is one of guilt: ‘The very fact that this is criminal 
investigation implies that a certain suspicion of criminal guilt attaches to a 
certain individual’ (1982:69). He adds to this what he terms a practical 
point: that the line of least resistance and the least possible effort is to 
stick to one hypothesis and to change the direction of the search for the 
facts as little as possible: ‘the economics of effort do not encourage more 
effort if the result can be achieved by less’ (1982:30). He also argues that 
the commitment to a culture of truth-finding is much less fundamental in 
the criminal justice community than that of the scientific, concluding that 
only a strong counter bias can neutralise the initial perception of guilt and 
that this can only be provided by dialogue. Similarly, Jackson has argued 
that the kind of dialogue between the investigator’s vision of the evidence 
as a whole and his or her vision of its constituent parts that derives from 
modern accounts of science, is most likely to be found where factfinders 
engage in argument and counterargument with other parties, using doubt 
and debate as mechanisms of discovery (Jackson, op. cit. especially at 
522-3). 
This suggests that the advantage of an active truth finding judicial 
figure within the inquisitorial tradition may be undermined where there is 
no culture of doubt and no effective institutionalized dialogue to suggest 
alternative hypotheses; it also raises questions about the role of the 
defence. The defence in the inquisitorial tradition have a limited role, 
traditionally seen as presenting a particular reading at trial of the 
evidence already collected in the dossier during the pre-trial process. 
Given that the defence lawyer is an outsider to the investigation and 
therefore not party to the original suspicion of guilt, he or she is perhaps 
best placed to suggest alternative hypotheses and further investigations 
based on those hypotheses. The traditionally limited defence role would 
therefore seem to be a point of truth-finding vulnerability.  
Potential vulnerabilities in criminal justice systems are not only 
found within the logic of the account given within a particular procedural 
tradition. They can also flow from a distance between the theory of truth-
finding and contemporary realities on the ground. The latter may come to 
be shaped more and more by financial considerations, with the demand to 
formally process more cases increasing at the same time as state 
austerity becomes normalized.6 But if reality takes the form of 
miscarriages of justice so that the theoretical truth-finding capacities and 
guarantees of the system are seen to have failed, this can also force 
reforms and adjustments. In the coming sections we will look at 
vulnerabilities of, and reforms to criminal justice in England and Wales 
and the Netherlands, seeking to discover where, how and why such 
vulnerabilities have revealed themselves and what the scope and shape of 
reform has been. 
 
Adversarial truth-finding in England and Wales 
 
Although Criminal Procedure Rules declare the acquitting of the innocent 
and conviction of the guilty to be an explicit aim of criminal process, it is 
difficult to set out clearly the underpinning model for adversarial fact-
finding in England and Wales. In the last 30 years there have been three 
major reviews of criminal process (two Royal Commissions in 1981 and 
1993 and the Auld Report in 2001). All explicitly endorsed the adversarial 
tradition as the underlying basis of the system but said almost nothing 
about theories of adversarial fact-finding. Thus we have no officially 
endorsed, specific account of how truth is to be found.  
In part this may be because the requirements of procedural fairness 
and truth-finding are not clearly distinguished within the tradition. The 
Anglo-American adversarial concept of fair procedure (due process) is 
also thought to provide the basis for truth-finding and legitimate decision-
making. Thus, the legitimacy of fact-finding seems to flow indirectly from 
the presumed legitimacy of the process rather than being a distinct direct 
                                                      
6 For more on economics and incentives in relation to evidence, see Posner (1999, 
2001).  
aim necessitating distinct means to directly accomplish it. One apparent 
consequence is the implicit assumption of recent Royal Commissions and 
the Auld Report that explaining how truth is to be found would not be 
helpful. But the danger is that this may allow uncertainties to continue 
about the roles of key parties in fact-finding: procedural assumptions 
about the pre-trial roles and relations of police, prosecutor and defence 
lawyers may not be clearly set out in law or in practice on the ground. 
Despite this lack of explicit theory, it is possible to (re)construct 
what one might describe as the classical account of the logic of 
adversarial truth-finding that hinges on a truth-finding dialogue. 
Autonomous parties seek out and present evidence at trial supporting 
their case: under conditions of equality of arms the ensuing choc des 
opinions allows an impartial truth-finder to adjudicate on facts.  This 
theory depends on effective construction of alternative narratives at trial, 
suggesting that one point of adversarial ‘trust’ is in the existence of 
active, autonomous investigation by defence lawyers who are expected to 
seek out and interview witnesses, to commission forensic and expert 
evidence and not simply to leave the accumulation of exonerating 
evidence to the state. 
Yet the admittedly limited empirical evidence we have of general 
defence practice suggests that not only is there usually no equality of 
investigative arms but that there are not even two full independent 
investigations before the initial trial. In reality, a single police 
investigation is followed by a review by the defence of disclosed 
prosecution materials and very little active defence search for new 
exonerating materials. The only substantial empirical study of defence 
lawyers in England and Wales to have specifically considered the search 
for exculpatory evidence remains that conducted by a team led by Mike 
McConville in the late 1980s and early 1990s (1994).7 They concluded 
                                                      
7 The book is based on 198 researcher weeks of observation, on a limited series of 
formal interviews with qualified solicitors and a more comprehensive set of interviews 
with articled clerks (i.e. trainee solicitors). 
that defence lawyers’ ‘favourite strategy’ consisted of waiting until the 
prosecution papers arrive and then putting that case to the client for 
comment. With a few isolated exceptions, little independent investigative 
work was undertaken by defence advisers beyond interviewing any 
potential witnesses that the client cared to produce. In 198 weeks of 
fieldwork, the researchers observed only eighteen such interviews of 
possible defence witnesses and little other evidence of proactive defence 
investigative strategies. Often investigative work (such as getting 
evidence of injuries or finding witnesses) was delegated to the defendants 
themselves.  
Might this absence of proactive autonomous defence investigation 
simply reflect the banal reality of most criminal cases? Perhaps the issues 
were simple and did not need defence investigation? Would the picture be 
different in more serious cases such as homicide and rape (the ones likely 
to become famous as miscarriages of justice)? In fact, if one considers 
the evidence of acknowledged or alleged miscarriages of justice in 
England and Wales, similar themes emerge of lack of proactive defence 
investigation even in these most serious cases. In recent publications 
(Robins ed. 2012, 2013), a range of experienced lawyers and 
investigative journalists have argued that inadequate preparation by first 
instance defence lawyers is a key causal influence in many miscarriages 
of justice. The problems identified have been various (Malone and Platt 
2013). A full account of the client’s version of events is sometimes not 
taken early enough or thoroughly enough, complex work sometimes 
delegated to inexperienced or underqualified staff. Potential witnesses are 
not always interviewed, appropriate experts not instructed, relevant tests 
not ordered and relevant sites not visited. Finally, unused material may 
not be requested from the prosecution or disclosed materials not 
scrutinised in enough depth. From a number of examples cited of 
miscarriages related to these issues one can pick out the following: the 
defence failure to seek out alibi witnesses in Dougherty (1974) and 
Fergus (1991), to examine the photos on the mobile phone of Sam 
Hallam (2012), to seek out school records in Anver Daud Sheikh (2004), 
to commission psychiatric reports on the reliability of Ian Lawless’ 
confession (2009), to make necessary site visits in Pountley (1996).8  
Various explanations have been offered for this absence of proactive 
autonomous defence investigation which range from the scandalous to 
the understandable. Some authors have identified a certain cultural 
contempt held by defence lawyers for the clients and presumptions of 
their guilt (Newman 2012, 2013, McConville and others 1994). Others 
argue that dealing with large criminal investigations such as those 
undertaken in relating to homicides and rapes involves particular and 
unusually complex demands and there is a lack of this kind of experience 
in many criminal law firms (Malone and Platt 2013). Many cite the 
material pressures on lawyers working on legal aid as a disincentive to 
invest time in individual cases and in particular the impact of graduated 
fixed fees (Nurse 2013: 77). Finally, there are always the inherent 
structural disadvantages that defence lawyers have in relation to a state 
police: their limited powers to secure witnesses and materials and the 
intrinsic limitations of forensic reports on materials already examined 
(and thus altered) by earlier prosecution examinations (McBarnet 1981: 
85-101).  
 
Shifting points of trust? The truth-finding police investigation in 
an adversarial context 
The logic of adversarial fact-finding depends on some rough equality of 
investigative arms: otherwise the relative strength of the competing 
versions of reality presented at trial will reflect the inequality of 
investigative arms rather than the intrinsic merit of the potential evidence 
out there. Before the arrival of a professional police force in England and 
Wales in the 1830s, when most prosecutions were conducted by victims 
rather than the state, this may have been a less manifest structural 
                                                      
8 For the cases of Lawless and Sheikh see Newby (2013: 65-66), on Dougherty and 
Pountley see Green (2013) 
problem. But it is hard to see that there could ever be equality of arms in 
the 20th and 21st century contest between legal aided solicitors and 
teams of state investigative police with their inherently superior access to 
witnesses, surveillance materials, forensic science support and data 
bases.  
One response has been to suggest that the ‘cultural trust’ of the 
system in terms of fact-finding is no longer constructed along traditional 
adversarial lines. We now expect the primary state actors, police and 
prosecutors, to behave in a quasi-judicial manner. Thus the Runciman 
Commission, a Royal Commission set up on the day of the release of the 
Birmingham 6, argued that it was the ‘duty of the police to investigate 
fairly and thoroughly all the relevant evidence, including that which 
exonerates the suspect’ (Runciman 1993: 9). The difficulty is that this 
assertion – with its implication of shifting points of cultural trust – has 
never been coherently set out in detailed legal duties, the Commission 
specifying neither the nature of the duty nor its legal source.  
However there has been some judicial endorsement of principle that 
the police have a legal duty to seek out exculpatory evidence. In Fergus, 
where the police failed, despite many requests from the prosecution, to 
interview alibi witnesses cited by the defendant in interview, Lord Justice 
Steyn, giving the decision of the Court of Appeal, referred to the police’s 
‘lamentable failure to investigate. If they had carried out their duty, it is 
unlikely that Ivan [Fergus] would have been convicted.’9 Yet the Court 
does not indicate the legal origins or scope of that duty and the comment 
itself is obiter dictum. That means that the legal principle enunciated – 
that the police had a duty to investigate exonerating evidence – was not 
necessary to the decision. Under the English doctrine of precedent, the 
case does not therefore establish a legal principle that binds future courts.  
The police’s duty to seek out exculpatory evidence has also been 
evoked in ‘soft law’ in the form of administrative Codes of Practice and 
                                                      
9 R v Fergus [1994] 98 Cr. App. R. 313 at 322 
Guidance which are not sources of law – they do not constitute secondary 
legislation – and thus strictly speaking do not establish legal duties. 
Section 23 Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 states that the 
Home Secretary shall issue a Code of Practice (on disclosure of evidence) 
to ensure inter alia that ‘where a criminal investigation is conducted all 
reasonable steps are taken for the purposes of the investigation and, in 
particular, all reasonable lines of inquiry are pursued.’ Now that clearly 
does establish a legal duty, but upon the Home Secretary to issue the 
Code of Practice not on the police to obey. Paragraph 3.5 of the Code of 
Practice on Disclosure issued by the Home Office, states that the 
`…investigator should pursue all reasonable lines of inquiry, whether 
these point towards or away from the suspect. What is reasonable will 
depend on the particular circumstances.’10 But the Code of Practice itself 
does not establish legally binding duties though it is certainly admissible 
in evidence and its breach may be taken into account in determining legal 
proceedings. Similar views are expressed in the latest version of the 
Director of Public Prosecutions Guidance On Charging (2013) and joint 
(police and prosecutor) operational instructions for the disclosure of 
unused material.11 But these are not authoritative sources of law either.  
The question is whether this is adequate to the task of effectively 
establishing a practice which seems to run contrary to the adversarial 
tradition of autonomous partisan parties. The most obvious difficulty is 
the lack of clarity in definition: what are ‘reasonable lines of inquiry’ and 
who determines what they are? If there is no effective means for the 
defence to challenge police decisions to not pursue a line of inquiry the 
answer is effectively a matter of police discretion. Historically the English 
courts have been reluctant to use either the public law remedies available 
                                                      
10 Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, Code of Practice on Disclosure, Para. 
3.4 
11 The Director's Guidance On Charging 2013 - fifth edition, May 2013 (revised 
arrangements) see para 3. Guidance to Police Officers and Crown Prosecutors Issued by 
the Director of Public Prosecution under S37A of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
1984, para. 2.5 
under judicial review or to allow private suits for negligence in relation to 
police investigations. Only where the individual affected can establish a 
clear violation of internal norms set out in guidance, regulations or Codes 
of Practice is that likely to succeed (Field and Roberts 2002: 502-508). In 
the absence of clear definitions of ‘reasonable lines of inquiry’ in the 
circumstances of the particular case that is not likely.   
In recent times, Codes of Practice have sometimes influenced police 
behaviour (for example in relation to interrogation practice and recording 
of confessions) because breach has led to exclusion of prosecution 
evidence at trial. But it is hard to see what to exclude because the police 
have not pursued particular investigations. Finally, neither the Criminal 
Cases Review Commission nor the Court of Appeal see evidence of flawed 
police investigations as in itself grounds for overturning convictions: 
usually the defence has to produce new evidence which undermines a 
significant element of the prosecution case against the suspect. So only 
by following the unexplored lead and discovering something new does this 
bring redress. And here it will be the ‘newness’ and significance of the 
exculpatory evidence that counts, not the failure of the police to explore 
it. 
So there is a certain paradox here. The adversarial tradition is said 
to be based on distrust of the state, preferring to invest trust in the 
initiative of autonomous parties and the impartiality of community 
representatives rather than an active truth-finding magistrate. Yet here 
trust is placed on the state police to find the truth even in the absence of 
a supervising magistrate with legal powers to direct them to pursue 
particular lines of inquiry. Furthermore, we have a number of empirical 
reasons for being cautious about trusting police to pursue exculpatory 
evidence. There is the widespread experimental and other evidence of 
confirmation bias or tunnel vision as a general psychological 
phenomenon. More specifically, recent empirical studies of homicide 
investigations emphasize how the prospect of an adversarial contested 
trial ‘permeates and foreshadows all aspects of detective decision-making 
in murder cases’ (Brookman and Innes 2013a: 285). Police investigative 
strategy is built on anticipating and shutting down lines of defence 
(Brookman and Innes 2013b: 297). In particular, the moment there is a 
‘prime suspect’ he or she becomes the dominant focus and priority for 
investigation. Furthermore, Innes emphasizes that SIOs are under 
pressure to be aware of costs of investigations: ‘once the suspect was 
identified, there was immense pressure to discontinue previous lines of 
enquiry which were now seen as unproductive and costly. This is a risky 
strategy over the long term, as to some extent it precludes alternative 
hypotheses about the crime being considered’ (261-2). This focus on 
existing hypotheses is particularly strong where officers feel under 
pressure to deliver (256).  
This tendency to focus on a suspect and to search for incriminating 
evidence against him or her was evident in the famous miscarriages of 
justice that came to light in the 1980s. In these cases, once detectives 
were clear that a suspect was guilty, they felt themselves under no 
obligation to pursue exculpatory lines of inquiry (Sanders 1987: 230-234, 
Field 1994: 119). This suggested the operation of adversarial assumptions 
in relation to the police role: it was for the defence to pursue such 
material. These assumptions are still evident in more recent cases. For 
example, in the Fergus case, in the six months between arrest and trial, 
the police made no attempt to trace any of the four alibi witnesses that 
Fergus cited in his first police interview despite seven different requests 
by the Crown Prosecution Service and Prosecution counsel. Convinced by 
an earlier (false) identification that the suspect was guilty, no doubt they 
took the view that these witnesses (who were his friends) would not help 
the case for the prosecution. And why should the officers help the case for 
the defence if they considered Fergus guilty? And why would they have 
charged him if they did not think he was guilty? Similar police failures to 
pursue alternative lines of inquiry which point away from the prime 
suspect are evident in the still unresolved case of Susan May. These 
include a failure to follow up evidence pointing to an alternative suspect 
and a red Ford Fiesta, unoccupied but with the engine running, outside 
the victim’s house at midnight on the night she was killed. There is also 
evidence that the police may have persuaded witnesses to give accounts 
pointing away from alternative theories of the case so as to concentrate 
on building a case against their prime suspect (Allison 2013, Green 
2013)). 
 
Redressing an imbalance of investigative arms? The limitations to 
prosecution disclosure of exculpatory evidence 
It is sometimes argued that certain procedural ‘advantages’ compensate 
the defence for inequalities in investigative resources and thus re-balance 
the contest to present convincing narrative at trial. For example, we have 
asymmetrical obligations of disclosure, a high standard of proof with its 
burden (generally) on the prosecution, the right to silence and the 
exclusion of various kinds of evidence thought to be unduly prejudicial or 
obtained in unacceptable ways. These mechanisms may well prevent the 
conviction of at least some defendants where the incriminating evidence 
is not strong (and thus protect some innocent suspects). But it is hard to 
see most of them as effectively compensating the defence for their 
structural investigative fact-finding weaknesses because that would 
involve comparing the incommensurable: how do you measure the impact 
of these very different kinds of advantages and disadvantages? And the 
paradox is that over the last 20 years many of these structural defence 
advantages have been eroded or qualified exactly because they are said 
to obstruct accurate truth-finding.  
The only possible exception is the development of duties of 
prosecution disclosure. If there is no political will to finance two full 
autonomous investigations of the same incident, one plausible claim for a 
procedural advantage that might assist defence construction of alternative 
narratives is access to prosecution materials. This might suggest that we 
should begin to see the role of the defence in criminal investigations in 
England and Wales more in terms of making new and alternative 
connections between facts established by the police investigation. But the 
massive amount of information and the complexity of possible 
interrelations between elements of unused materials in complex 
investigations raise questions about the capacity of solicitors to process 
the material effectively. There are material disincentives for defence 
lawyers: under the graduated fixed fee system now used to fund legal 
aid, solicitors get a sum based on the number of pages disclosed, not the 
time taken to read them (Nurse 2013:77, Garland and McEwan 2012: 
245). Defence solicitors do not have access to the HOLMES computer 
technology used by the police to organise complex investigations and only 
the more specialist use Case Map (the equivalent for defence lawyers). 
Unused schedules are at best organised according to the categories and 
assumptions of the prosecution narrative and at worst the nature and 
form of prosecution disclosure of investigative materials conceals as much 
as it reveals. Given that unused material can run to thousands of pages, 
misfiling or odd filing makes it difficult to use the files to both follow the 
development of the police investigation and appreciate the significance of 
potentially exculpatory material (Evans 2012). As a result, it is common 
in the process of revealing miscarriages for connections to be made by 
the defence between facts that might in theory have been ‘known’ to 
them for some time. Often, these connections will be made after 
conviction or even after initial appeals have failed. 
 We only have room here to point to a few examples of defence 
failure to exploit disclosed materials. In relation to Miller, one of the 
Cardiff 3 originally convicted of the murder of Lynette White, witness 
statements placing Miller in a pool hall 20 minutes after her death, were 
amongst the unused materials but their significance was not appreciated 
(Sekar 2013: 28). In Adams (2007) there were clear failures on a late 
returned brief to properly examine unused material and HOLMES 
computer base material to inform cross-examination. In the Susan May 
case (2012), the defence failed to appreciate the significance of 
photographs illustrating chemical enhancement of her prints on a wall 
(Green 2013).  
 
Correcting mistakes: appeals and the adversarial tradition 
There are thus certain systemic truth-finding vulnerabilities within the 
criminal process in England and Wales linked to weaknesses in the truth-
finding capacities of the adversarial tradition or in the capacity to put into 
practice the assumptions on which it is based: the systemic imbalance in 
investigative arms as between prosecution and defence, the rhetorical but 
not properly operationalized expectation of a police search for exculpatory 
evidence and the inadequacy of prosecution disclosure as a mechanism 
for remedying structural defence disadvantage in constructing alternative 
narratives. This suggests that truth-finding mistakes are to be expected 
from first instance decision-making. How adequate is the criminal process 
in England and Wales to the identifying and remedying of these first 
instance mistakes? 
In fact, adversarial procedural assumptions also restrict the scope 
and effectiveness of the review and appeal process in England and Wales. 
Primarily, there is the view that fact-finding is best conducted through the 
oral examination of witnesses – especially their cross-examination – at 
public trial before a jury. Because criminal appeals from jury decisions will 
be heard by professional judges based largely on case papers and legal 
argument, the Court of Appeal defines its role in practice in quite 
restricted terms. The policing of jury decisions in relation to arguments 
and evidence presented at trial is not only regarded as unnecessary but 
unacceptable. Thus the Court of Appeal does not see itself as a 'double 
degré de juridiction' within the terms of the inquisitorial Continental 
tradition and acts more like a court of review rather than of appeal. It 
generally requires some fresh evidence that has not been considered by 
the first instance fact-finder before a conviction is quashed. Only very 
exceptionally may convictions be quashed on the basis of a ‘lurking doubt’ 
where little or no new evidence is presented that was unavailable at 
trial.12  
Thus the assumption is that any credible defence narratives that 
may exist can be (and therefore should be) presented at first instance. In 
practice, only defence evidence or argument that could not have been 
made at first instance can be the basis for appeal. This seems to reflect 
culturally informed but false institutional assumptions about the way the 
investigative process works: that advance prosecution disclosure, 
supported by independent active investigation by the defence, routinely 
provides the basis for strong defence narrative building and thus 
something like equality of arms. But if in many serious cases the defence 
in fact lack the capacity or will either to conduct active independent pre-
trial investigations or to make sense of the ‘unused materials’ disclosed 
by the prosecution, the cultural assumptions of the system become points 
of weakness rather than points of strength.  
 
 
Inquisitorial truth-finding in the Netherlands  
 
The Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure opens with the admonishment that 
investigation and trial shall take place only according to rules laid down in 
legislation. These include the Code itself, the Criminal Code, other laws 
governing the judiciary, the prosecution service and the police, and laws 
providing for procedural exceptions. This principle of legality is assumed 
to ensure that the state (the criminal justice authorities and courts) not 
only has adequate powers to investigate and punish, but is also subject to 
sufficient monitoring and control to prevent abuse. The latter are already 
present in the concept of trias politica, which gives the judiciary powers of 
scrutiny of executive decisions in matters of law. They are also provided 
by hierarchical monitoring and controls within the criminal justice system 
itself: the police are subordinate to the public prosecutor and the 
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prosecutor to the court (and in some instances to an investigating judge), 
while the hierarchical organisation of police force and prosecution service 
allows control by, and accountability to, superiors. Decisions as to the 
facts by the court of first instance are subject to scrutiny by the (higher) 
court of appeal (in the form of a re-trial); points of law can be raised 
before the Supreme Court. And finally, just in case this whole system 
should somehow produce an untruth, there is revision before the 
Supreme Court: a case may be reopened if new evidence casts doubt on 
the original decision, a procedure designed to prevent the Supreme Court 
from becoming a court of third (factual) instance. It must first establish 
the existence of new evidence (novum) and then that such evidence, had 
it been known at the time, would have led the final fact-finding court to 
acquit. If so, the case will be referred for retrial to an appeal court.  
 Thus the written law provides safeguards and gives power to the 
executive to infringe individual rights in the course of a criminal 
investigation. However, it does not set out specifically two key premises 
that are simply self-evident given the state’s dual role as guardian of both 
social and individual interests. First, that the basic objective is truth-
finding. Secondly, that finding the substantive truth implies a criminal 
investigation and presentation of evidence at trial that are not only as 
complete as possible, but also non-partisan, taking into account the 
possibility that a person may be guilty or innocent. Strictly speaking, 
inquisitorial procedure knows no parties (in the sense of adversaries), 
only participants. The key to the legitimacy of substantive truth-finding is 
thus not debate in court based on two independent, partisan 
investigations, but inquisition, inquiry, by non-partisan state officials, 
acting according to the law and subject to internal control. The rules of 
criminal procedure reflect this basic tenet .  
The trial dossier compiled by the prosecutor on the basis of the 
police file allows scrutiny of both pre-trial investigation and evidence . It 
should contain a full account of investigative steps and all relevant 
documents and warrants, and is available to the trial court. This enables 
the court to take an active role in investigating the case at trial. The 
defence are neither required, nor expected or even allowed, to present an 
independent case. Rather, their role is to ‘look over the prosecutor’s 
shoulder’ during the investigation and compilation of the dossier and to 
point to any indications of innocence that may have remained unexplored, 
at which point the prosecutor should explore them. Should he consider 
this unnecessary or simply not do it, the defence may request that either 
an investigating judge or the trial court order further investigations to be 
conducted; whether they do so, depends on whether they deem it 
necessary for truth-finding purposes. Once the trial begins, the primary 
role of the defence is to cast doubt on the prosecution case, among other 
things, by prompting the judge to ask the relevant questions.  
Although the trial court has an actively investigative function, the 
central role of the dossier means that there is only one version of the 
truth on paper to guide its investigation. This agenda-setting function of 
the dossier, assumed to contain all incriminating and exculpating 
evidence, places the emphasis very much on pre-trial procedure and pre-
empts the necessity of producing all of the evidence and every witness in 
court. It should also be noted that the defence must ask the prosecutor to 
call witnesses who the prosecution have not called themselves (or ask the 
court to order the prosecutor to call them), and that there is no automatic 
right to produce one’s own ‘expert for the defence’. The very terms 
‘defence witness’ and ‘expert for the defence’ are anomalies, for they 
imply partisanship. Where there are no ‘parties’, only ‘participants’, 
inquisitorial procedure knows only witnesses  whose testimony may or 
may not be favourable to the defence, and experts accredited to the 
court, all in the service of the substantive truth. 
With substantive truth the primary goal, and investigation by state 
officials according to law the means of achieving it, the critical point of 
trust hinges on the principle of legality and the professional integrity of 
those officials to actually behave as the law and its underlying 
assumptions prescribe. This is particularly important now that pre-trial 
investigation by the police and prosecution sets the agenda for the trial 
process. The lack of external controls and the often truncated nature of 
debate in open court hinder a truly transparent process. Even the 
requirement that the court give reasoned decisions, although contributing 
to external transparency, has its roots in scrutiny through appeal to a 
higher court, allowing it to examine the validity of the first decision. Trust 
is therefore vested in an institution that has to be assumed to police 
itself, if its decisions on guilt or innocence are to regarded as ‘truthful’ 
and therefore legitimate (Jörg et al., 1996).   
Trust in all political and public institutions in the Netherlands is 
traditionally high (K. Brants 2013). That applies perhaps less to the 
police, but is particularly the case for the judiciary; the prosecution 
service is probably somewhere in the middle (De Keijser et al. 2004). 
Indeed, there is no small degree of (self)-satisfaction as to the workings 
of criminal justice with its professional judges and quasi-judicial 
prosecutors. The Dutch are pleased to be among the few continental 
systems without lay participation (an inquisitorial system by no means 
precludes a jury) and the public at large and even legal scholars 
sometimes seem convinced that an adversarial system by definition 
involves an ignorant jury, biased prosecution and police, and is, therefore, 
to be regarded as seriously handicapped in establishing the truth in 
criminal matters (De Roos 2000; Groenhuijsen & Knigge 2004, 107-109). 
While a deal of this prejudice is based on media reporting of sensational 
cases such as O.J. Simpson and, further in the past, the Birmingham Six 
and other miscarriages in England and Wales, it has also helped confirm 
the self-fulfilling belief that the Dutch system, because it could be trusted, 
did not produce such wrongful convictions and therefore could be trusted.  
Research in 1992 (Crombag et. al., Wagenaar et al. 1993) 
suggested that possibly scores of miscarriages had gone unnoticed (until 
then only two – in 1923 and 1984 – had been officially acknowledged) 
and that this was, at least in part, due to the way the system itself 
worked. This was dismissed by practically the entire legal community as 
unscientific and unconvincing (e.g. Schuyt, 1992). Such reluctance to 
countenance that Dutch inquisitorial process could somehow produce 
wrongful convictions persisted even after it became apparent that the 
researchers had a point. The potential strength of the system – non-
partisan pre-trial investigation, the professional integrity of those 
conducting it, the active investigative role of the court, elaborate rules of 
evidence, internal monitoring and control and the possibilities of appeal 
and revision (in short, its ability to police itself) – was also a potential 
weakness.  
 
Vulnerabilities 
The Dutch criminal justice system works, and gets it right – most of the 
time. Retrial by a higher appeal court probably catches a number of 
potential miscarriages, although there is little research to confirm this or 
say how many. However, the reliance on one single version of events, the 
result of one investigation by the police and collected by the prosecution 
(albeit possibly prompted by the defence) into the dossier to be verified 
at trial, makes the system singularly vulnerable to confirmation bias. 
Paradoxically, although internal control all along the process, with each 
following authority checking the previous one’s decisions, would seem a 
logical way to catch mistakes at an early stage, the same mechanism also 
allows those mistakes to move through the system with almost inexorable 
logic towards a wrongful conviction. In the miscarriages of justice that 
have come to light since 2002, tunnel vision and confirmation bias have 
been a major common factor. False confessions to the police and incorrect 
or misunderstood expert evidence come a close second (see i.a.: Van 
Koppen 2003; Van Koppen and Schalken, 2004; Israels, 2004; Derksen, 
2006; De Ridder et al., 2008, ch. 6; 20 Van Koppen 2011; Brants, 2012).  
Such is the institutional trust in the integrity of the system and its 
officials that higher authorities are inclined to rely on the findings of 
previous decision makers and take them at face value. Case law itself 
instructs the court to proceed on the assumption that the dossier contains 
all relevant information and that the prosecutor’s decision as to what is 
relevant is correct, unless the opposite is either glaringly obvious or can 
be shown by the defence.13 However, more often than not the defence is 
unable to show what is missing, lacking as it does the possibility of 
conducting its own pre-trial investigations. In general, the lack of external 
controls, in particular a defence that can produce an alternative reading of 
the ‘truth’ backed up by ‘alternative’ evidence, compounds the problem of 
tunnel vision. 
Although the defendant and the defence have rights such as 
privileged communication and access to the dossier, the emphasis on 
substantive truth-finding by the state and the realisation that pre-trial 
rights could hinder the investigation, means that the provisions granting 
these rights also have a proviso: ‘ …unless in the opinion of the 
investigating judge (or prosecutor, as the case may be) the interests of 
the investigation make the exercise of right X undesirable’ (or some such 
formulation). Access to the full dossier is only guaranteed unconditionally 
from ten days before the onset of the trial; before that, the defence must 
try to persuade the prosecutor to allow access. This need not be a 
problem, but when it is, it undermines the assumption that the defence 
lawyer can act as a prompt to the prosecutor in matters of possible 
evidence favourable to the defendant. The most important steps in the 
development of the dossier – and the prosecutor’s version of the truth – 
take place from the very beginning of the investigation, but this is a time 
when the defence has fewest opportunities to intervene.  
Precisely because of this, the system is surrounded by guarantees 
that should compensate for the lack of autonomous defence participation 
and contribution, but these safeguards date from the enactment of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure in 1926, and have been systematically eroded 
over the course of decades, in particular since the end of the 20th 
Century. A range of factors – fear of crime, general feelings of insecurity, 
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political and media demands for more and better crime control, assertions 
that defence rights are abused in criminal procedure as well as financial 
constraints – have all led to new legislation aimed at more efficient pre-
trial investigation and court procedure and at more convictions. The 
powers of the prosecutor have been substantially increased, those of the 
investigative magistrate (an extra and impartial safeguard in criminal 
investigation) reduced.14 Defence rights have been curtailed, as has 
retrial: in the interests of efficiency, appeal courts may, and under certain 
circumstances do, rely on evidence and witnesses originally produced 
without re-examining them. 
Such changes have resulted, perhaps unconsciously, in the desired 
aim of the trial being defined as a conviction rather than as the 
substantive truth, thereby undermining the commitment to impartiality 
and increasing the likelihood of tunnel vision and confirmation bias. 
Concomitantly, a number of prosecutors came to prefer the role of crime 
fighter to the traditionally favoured magisterial, non-partisan prosecutor 
(Van de Bunt, 1985; C. Brants and K. Brants, 2002: 8). Few Dutch police 
officers would wilfully ignore indications of innocence and there is no 
evidence they resort to violence during interrogations. However, in the 
confirmed cases of wrongful conviction, substantial media pressure to find 
the perpetrator, combined with officers seeking confirmation of existing 
suspicions, produced coercive investigations and in some cases false 
confessions. And rather than check whether all avenues had been 
explored, prosecutors sought to verify the prima facie police case and 
present it through the dossier to the court.  
The court is the final and most important monitor of police and 
prosecution activities pre-trial, but judges are strongly influenced by how 
the prosecution presents the case (De Keijser et al. 2004), and the fact 
that they have prior knowledge of it through the dossier promotes 
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 Partly as a result of several miscarriages of justice (see infra), as of 1 January 2013 
the position of the investigating judge has been somewhat reinstated in the sense that 
his role as the hierarchical monitor of the prosecutioin has been reinforced. Wet 
Versterking positive rechter-commissaris (Staatsblad. 2012, 408). 
confirmation bias. Some have said that truth finding in a Dutch court is 
not focused on active investigation of whether the evidence points beyond 
reasonable doubt to the guilt of the defendant, but on confirmation that it 
does not contradict the prosecutor’s assertion that the defendant is guilty 
(Van Koppen and Schalken, 2004). Elaborate rules of evidence should 
prevent this: there must be a specified amount of corroborated, not 
merely circumstantial evidence and even then the court may only convict, 
after deliberations in chamber, if it is convinced by that evidence. There 
are, however, indications that judges, basing their deliberations on the 
dossier, look for corroborating evidence to confirm what they already 
think. In its written reasoning, the court need not discuss all available 
evidence and any residual doubt it may have had, even though judges 
must give a reasoned response to specific defences. Unanimity is not 
required, and although a career judiciary is assumed to bring the 
guarantee of impartiality and the rationality of the legally trained mind to 
the process, the fact that career judges take decisions as a matter of 
routine makes it all too possible that a process of group-think governs 
deliberations, brooking no contradiction (De Keijser et al. 2004, 36-38). 
A final point of both potential strength and weakness concerns the 
position of experts, who in Dutch procedure are not witnesses but simply 
experts to the court with no other obligation than to explain, according to 
professional standards of ethical conduct, what their scientific conclusions 
mean. This emphatically non-partisan role would seem better suited to 
truth-finding than experts testifying for one or other party (however much 
they may, in theory, be beholden to the same professional, scientific 
standards). However, an inquisitorial court may be just as likely as an 
adversarial jury to give too much weight to expert testimony and forensic 
evidence or to misunderstand it. In either system, neither judges nor 
defence lawyers are knowledgeable enough to ask the relevant scientific 
questions, but the absence of an expert for the defence means that the 
Dutch court is exclusively dependent upon its own amateur evaluation. 
Moreover, it is not unknown for Dutch experts to identify, consciously or 
unconsciously with the prosecution case, as happened in more than one 
wrongful conviction. 
 
Cases in point: Schiedam park murder15 and Lucia de Berk 
While all of the miscarriages demonstrate the risks of institutional trust in 
the infallibility of the Dutch system, two are particularly good examples. 
The first, the Schiedam Park Murder, concerns two children, respectively 
killed and injured after a sexual assault. The police focussed on a passer-
by, a known paedophile, who confessed under protracted interrogation 
although he did not fit the survivor’s description of the attacker and other 
witness statements were contradictory (though they agreed there was a 
bicycle). The suspect soon retracted the confession, his DNA was not 
found and an alibi gave him practically no time to commit the crime, yet 
he was convicted at first instance and then on appeal, primarily on the 
retracted confession and circumstantial evidence (he was in the park with 
a bicycle). The child’s evidence was dismissed as not credible, the 
prosecution’s (unlikely) reconstruction of the time frame and (equally 
unlikely) explanation of unidentified DNA on the body were accepted.  
Journalists then discovered that someone else, whose DNA matched 
and who had a record of violent sexual offenses against children and no 
alibi, had confessed spontaneously to the murder in the park, a month 
before the Supreme Court dismissed a request for revision, there being 
no ‘new evidence’. The convicted man was released and exonerated. And 
the prosecution service set up a commission of inquiry.  
It found that the police had pressured the suspect to confess, 
disregarded evidence in his favour and, backed up by a child psychologist, 
vainly exerted ‘inadmissible’ pressure on a young and traumatized 
witness to make him admit to fabricating his attacker’s description. 
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Scientists at the state forensic laboratory twice expressed serious doubts 
about the defendant’s guilt to the prosecutors because the only DNA 
found on both body and weapon was unidentified. They left this out of 
their report, nor did the prosecution tell the court or the defence. As a 
result, the experts were never questioned about doubts. A journalist also 
revealed that forensic institute scientists had been using the case during a 
course attended by some 200 police officers and prosecutors, to 
demonstrate how DNA-evidence had led to a wrongful conviction. One 
attendee blew the whistle and was subsequently fired for his pains. This 
led to Parliament demanding answers from the Minister of Justice. They 
accepted his version of events – ‘unintentional but serious mistakes’ – 
and his promise for a ‘programme of improvement’. 
 Immediately, a temporary commission – Commissie evaluatie 
afgesloten strafzaken or Commission for the Evaluation of Concluded 
Criminal Cases (CEAS) – was installed to examine possible other 
miscarriages; it referred several cases to the Supreme Court, of which 
two were eventually overturned. The second of these, Lucia de Berk,16 
concerned a nurse accused of murdering children in hospital. There was 
no direct evidence and she never confessed, but was convicted and 
sentenced to life. Interestingly and unlike Schiedam, in this case no-one 
did anything wrong. Expert (statistical) evidence used to convict in first 
instance was later repudiated and rejected by the appeal court; and on 
appeal the expert requested by the defence testified he ‘was now of the 
opinion’ that one of the children had been deliberately killed. The court 
found corroboration in Lucia’s diary where she had written of having to 
‘stop this compulsive behaviour’ (her explanation was that she was 
addicted to laying the tarot in the presence of dying patients). The final 
verdict rested on these two pieces of evidence and what was termed 
‘repeating proof’: the deaths of six children seemed inexplicable, expert 
evidence showed Lucia had murdered one child, so she must have 
murdered the others too.  
 Although some thought this conviction obviously wrongful, legally 
speaking there was enough proof. The courts (and experts) seem to have 
been carried away on the preconception of guilt that informed public 
opinion,17 the appeal court going out of its way to put the worst possible 
interpretation on the evidence. But the latter is a question of fact not 
usually within reach of the Supreme Court. Where was ‘new evidence’ to 
come from? One academic who studied the case (Derksen 2006) asked 
the new commission to reinvestgate, citing a ‘world renowned expert’ in 
the same type of natural death in sick children. Subsequently, the 
prosecution requested revision on the grounds that there had been no 
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murders. Revision was granted on the basis of ‘new scientific insights’, 
although this was hardly the case, given the prior existence of the book 
by the ‘world renowned expert’. De Berk was subsequently acquitted by 
the referral court.   
  
Remedies and Reforms 
In both of the above cases, tunnel vision and confirmation bias spread 
throughout the system. This had happened before, in the first wrongful 
conviction to come to light which was dismissed as an unfortunate 
incident.18 But the public outcry about Schiedam and later Lucia de Berk 
prompted action: the police, prosecution service and state forensic 
institute (NFI) developed a combined ‘Programme of improvements’ 
(Versterking opsporing en vervolging (2005). Partly it mixes the 
professional with common sense, requiring police and prosecutor training, 
proper collection and storing of evidence and clear and comprehensible 
forensic reports (Versterking opsporing en vervolging, 2005, 26, 37, 46–
50). Other measures are reactions to specific features of the Schiedam 
murder: NFI scientists must discuss doubts about the prosecution case 
with the NFI director and, with the latter’s permission, with prosecution 
and investigating judge (who may or may not decide to allow the defence 
to be present); an NFI report of doubts must be included in the dossier. 
Organized evaluation of all aspects of the case (exculpating and 
inculpating), internally by the police and then by the prosecution, is now 
mandatory. Prosecutors may seek review by a third party, such as an 
academic, although it is unclear what status such a reviewer would have. 
 Defence lawyers have long argued for audio-visual recording, but the 
prosecution service did not produce binding guidelines, now prolonged, 
until 2009.19 The real stumbling block has been the presence of lawyers 
during police questioning (Brants 2011), always fiercely resisted by the 
                                                      
18 Putten Murder, Exonerating decision App. Ct. Leeuwarden, 24 April 2002, LJN: AE1877 
[www.rechtspraak.nl] 
19 Aanwijzing auditief en visueel registreren van verhoren van aangevers, getuigen en 
verdachten, in force from 1.1.2013, Staatscourant 2012, 26 900. 
criminal justice authorities and by many academics even after the 
European Court of Human Rights’ judgement in Salduz v. Turkey, the 
string of decisions that followed and then the European Directive of 
2013.20  In the beginning, Dutch courts and criminal justice authorities 
latched onto the ambiguous wording of the European Court’s judgements 
to minimize their effect, allowing the presence of a lawyer for underage 
suspects only and a right of consultation with, but not the presence of, a 
lawyer for adults, all regulated through prosecution service guidelines.21 
With the deadline for implementation of the Directive looming in 
November 2016, the Supreme Court has finally and unequivocally ruled 
that lawyers have the right to be present in all cases as of 1 March 
2016.22 However, legislation has still not materialised, there being no 
organisation of or funding for the necessary legal assistance. In any 
event, it is highly restrictive of what lawyers will actually be allowed to 
do: be present, yes, but actively participate, let alone influence what their 
client may say, certainly not (Nan, 2015, 988-991). 
  As of 2012, the system of revision has also been reformed. New 
legislation has redefined ‘new evidence.’ Originally limited to facts that, 
had they been known at the time of the trial, would have led the court to 
acquit, it now includes forensic insights and evidence known at the time 
of trial but not recognised as significant by the tribunal of fact. Moreover, 
anyone considering themselves wrongfully convicted of a crime carrying a 
penalty of more than 12 years, may now file a request with the 
Procurator-General at the Supreme Court (PG) for further investigation.23 
Before deciding, the PG may forward the request to the permanent 
                                                      
20  Salduz v. Turkey, App. No. 36391/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008); Directive 2013/48/EU of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 on the right of access to 
a lawyer in criminal proceedings and in European arrest warrant proceedings, and on the 
right to have a third party informed upon deprivation of liberty and to communicate with 
third persons and with consular authorities while deprived of liberty, OJ  L 294. 
21 See e.g. HR 30 June 2009, LJN BH3084; ‘Aanwijzing rechtsbijstand politieverhoor 
(2010A007)’, Staatscourant 2010, 4003. 
22 HR: 2015:3608, NJ 2016/52, annotated A.H. Klip. 
23 The PG at the Supreme Court is not a member of the prosecution service. He is 
independent: his appointment is for life and his main function is to advise the Supreme 
Court as to the applicable law and the interests of justice in the specific cases that come 
before it. 
Adviescommissie afgesloten strafzaken [Advisory Commission on 
Concluded Criminal Cases] – ACAS.24 This Commission (which replaces 
the temporary CEAS commission) has five members and a secretary 
nominated by the PG and appointed by the Minister, with members drawn 
from the Bar, academia, or others with knowledge of criminal cases such 
as ex-police officers; only one (not the chairman) is a member of the 
prosecution service. ACAS must advise ‘independently and impartially’, to 
which end it has limited powers.  
     
Reforms and cultural trust  
 
England and Wales 
There is strong evidence that in England and Wales defence lawyers often 
struggle, even in very serious cases, to conduct the autonomous 
proactive search for exculpatory evidence upon which a traditional 
concept of adversarial fact-finding depends. Even a minimal attempt to 
reassert the need for proactive independent defence investigation seems 
unlikely under current conditions of state austerity. The state has never 
properly financed two investigations of the same incident and seems 
unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future.  
Rather than re-asserting traditional notions of adversarial truth-
finding the tendency has been to talk in terms which seem to overlay the 
English adversarial tradition with assumptions more consonant with that 
of the inquisitorial tradition: assertions of the duty of the police to seek 
out exculpatory evidence and of the Crown Prosecution Service to act 
quasi-judicially. Yet there has been a failure to understand what an 
examination of comparative research on the inquisitorial tradition might 
have revealed: that the credibility of an active truth-finding state 
investigation rests on clearly defined legal duties placed on the police and 
effective judicial powers of monitoring and supervision of the carrying out 
                                                      
24 Wet Hervorming Herziening ten Voordele, Staatsblad 2012, nr. 275 and Besluit 
adviescommissie afgesloten strafzaken(BAAS) Staatsblad 2012, nr. 405. 
of those duties. Given that the relevant police duty to seek out 
exculpatory evidence is set out only in the most general terms in soft law 
and there is no power vested in the CPS to require investigative acts of 
the police, we seem to be awkwardly perched between adversarial 
assumptions that do not reflect law in action and inquisitorial assumptions 
that have not even fully made their way into the law in books.  
This makes the Court of Appeal’s traditional deference to first 
instance jury decision-making highly problematic. The adversarial 
tradition of limited review of first-instance decision-making rather than 
re-hearing means that if there is not a balanced presentation of relevant 
contending evidence before the jury because of the absence of proactive 
defence investigation or thorough state pursuit of exculpatory evidence, 
then this cannot necessarily be rectified later. The emphasis on lay-
decision making within the English criminal justice process (and in 
particular the jury in serious cases) is rooted in a long political tradition of 
distrust of the state (Thompson 1980). The political argument that 
citizens should be protected at first instance trial from state coercion by 
interposing fellow citizens between them and conviction and punishment 
does not obviously entail a subsequent refusal on appeal to re-examine 
fully the evidential basis of any convictions and the weaknesses of the 
original process as an exercise in truth-finding. But the institutional 
imprimatur of the adversarial tradition exerts key influence: there has 
been a huge historic investment of resources in oral first-instance jury 
trials but there is what is in Continental terms only a small professional 
judiciary and a tiny cohort of appeal court judges.  
The Court of Appeal has explicitly stressed the importance in 
dealing with its caseload of the restricted nature of appeals within the 
adversarial tradition (Ashworth and Redmayne 2010: 373, citing R v 
Fortean [2009] EWCA Crim  437. Not surprisingly, a Court of Appeal 
struggling to deal with its current workload, finds the prospect of routine 
rights of appeal that involve re-hearings difficult to countenance. The 
Justice Select Committee recently recommended that the Law 
Commission should review the statutory grounds on which the Court of 
Appeal may allow appeals and consider legislative reform encouraging the 
quashing of a conviction where the Court has a serious doubt about the 
verdict even without fresh evidence or legal argument (Zander 2015).25 
This followed evidence, inter alia from leaders of several Innocence 
Projects, suggesting that all too often the Court of Appeal seemed unable 
or reluctant to overturn convictions in cases which raised doubts about 
the fact-finding reliability of first instance jury decisions but where it was 
difficult to point to new arguments or evidence.26 The Minister of Justice, 
Michael Gove rejected this, citing comments made to the Select 
Committee on the proposals by a former Lord Chief Justice, Lord Judge.27 
That intervention, supported by the current Lord Chief Justice, argued 
against the proposed changes, not, on this occasion, on the basis of the 
constitutional primacy of the jury, but because the jury had the ‘major 
advantage’ over the Court of Appeal of seeing and hearing the witness 
and observing the body language.28 Leaving aside psychological evidence 
suggesting that this provides little or no advantage in accurate truth-
finding (Roberts and Zuckerman 2010: 299-300, Dennis 2013: 682), 
what is striking is that it is the traditional adversarial reluctance to 
countenance appeals as re-hearings that seems to limit options for 
reform.  
What also emerges clearly from Lord Judge’s intervention is his 
reluctance to allow the Criminal Cases Review Commission with its more 
                                                      
25 The Justice Select Committee report is available online: 
http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-
select/justice-committee/publications/. Last consulted April 28 2016 
26 The written evidence submitted is available online: 
http://www.parliament.uk/justicecttee. Last consulted April 28 2016 
27 Letter from Rt Hon Michael Gove MP, Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for 
Justice, 30 September 2015, on freedom of information; the Criminal cases Review 
Commission; and joint enterprise . Available online at   
http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-
select/justice-committee/publications/ 
28Justice Select Committee Enquiry into Criminal Cases Review Commission, Written 
Evidence, available online at 
http://data.parliament.uk/WrittenEvidence/CommitteeEvidence.svc/EvidenceDocument/J
ustice/Criminal%20Cases%20Review%20Commission/written/18446.html 
inquisitorial investigative processes to share responsibility for final 
decision-making on guilt and innocence with the Court of Appeal. An 
institution that receives ‘evidence’ outside the traditional context of oral 
adversarial trial simply cannot be a legitimate fact-finder. All this leaves 
the system with the fundamental vulnerability with which we started: if 
first instance decision-making is not based on a balanced contest between 
contending views – and we have suggested reasons for thinking that this 
can be a problem even in serious cases – then the system does not have 
the means to put that right at a later stage. In a system built on the one-
shot trial you have only one shot.  
 
The Netherlands 
The title (in English) of the ‘programme of improvements’ that followed 
the Schiedam park murder case, ‘Reinforcing investigation and 
prosecution’ is telling: with the legislation to improve the revision 
procedure, refinement and reinforcement of the existing system are 
exactly what the measures have done. Throughout, the programme 
embraces the notion of the impartial, quasi-judicial prosecutor 
(Versterking opsporing en vervolging, 2005, 18–22), emphasizing that 
the prosecutor must evaluate the police case, not simply ask if there is 
sufficient evidence to convict. Overall, there is extreme reluctance to 
contemplate any form of external influence or control. Faith in Dutch 
criminal justice has been dealt a serious blow, but the system and its 
professional actors still rely on its most important critical point of trust: it 
polices itself, internally and hierarchically. This is again apparent in the 
law reinforcing the position of the investigating judge, making him/her a 
more efficient internal monitor of the pre-trial investigation.29The very 
idea of external influence in the form of monitoring what actually happens 
during police interrogations through audio-visual registration and 
especially through the presence of that pesky outsider, the defence 
                                                      
29
 See note 14 infra. 
lawyer, has met with resistance and procrastination. Even after the right 
of the defence to physically attend police interrogations has been forced 
on the Netherlands by the European Court, the resulting legislation will 
restrict what they can do.  
  The new advisory commission ACAS is an improvement on the 
original temporary commission, which worked explicitly under the 
authority of, and through the prosecution service. However, despite calls 
for a totally independent investigatory commission, or even for an 
administrative innocence commission that would both investigate and 
decide on possible miscarriages of justice (Brants and Franken, 2006; 
Crombag et al, 2009), the Minister has continued to reject the model of 
the CCRC for England and Wales as being unsuitable for an inquisitorial 
system. Precisely why is unclear; it is as if a totally independent 
commission would somehow undermine the authority of the prosecution 
service and the courts. The Dutch commission, despite the membership of 
outsiders, is effectively controlled by the PG: he decides its remit by the 
specificities of his request, has the new investigation opened and decides 
whether or not to put the case forward to the Supreme Court for revision.  
However independent he may be, and whatever his professional integrity, 
he is still part of the system in the same way that the courts are.  
 It is perhaps what happens at trial that poses the greatest problem, 
for the courts are constitutionally outside of any external control. Their 
crucial role as the final evaluator of the gathering of evidence pretrial and 
of its probative value, is governed by the law and by professional ethics. 
However, while the miscarriages demonstrate that the rules of evidence 
cannot prevent tunnel vision and despite enhanced training programmes, 
courts can still scrape together – and interpret – evidence in order to 
achieve a conviction. Indeed, the most recent revision case, that of the 
Breda Six30 in which the referral court has reconvicted, has all of the 
hallmarks of this and in that sense closely resembles the case of Lucia de 
                                                      
30 Based on the revision decision by the Supreme Court, HR:2012:BW7190 at 
www.rechtspraak.nl 
Berk (Deug and Stevens, 2015). 
Rules of evidence can be changed by the legislature, but that is a 
lengthy business.  At present a project ‘Modernising the Code of Criminal 
Procedure’ is ongoing. Critics have pointed to its overwhelming concern 
with efficiency and with further reinforcing the primacy of pre-trial 
investigation above the trial. This will reduce the cost, but also the 
necessity of producing evidence in court and at the same time require 
more of the defence in the way of prompting the court to investigate 
(Nan, 2016, 992-993). The latter is already an issue, as the Supreme 
Court has given numerous decisions which essentially force the defence 
into a more adversarial role without there being the corresponding party-
equality and autonomy that would allow them to fulfil it properly.  
 
 
Conclusion   
 
Despite the evidence of vulnerabilities in the procedural logic of both the 
adversarial and inquisitorial traditions, the underlying assumptions remain 
fundamental to the thinking of the key professional actors. Thus, the 
default reaction is to reinforce, not reform. In itself, such an approach to 
addressing what can go wrong may seem coherent in leaving intact the 
essential nature of the traditional process. But in the Dutch case, that 
leaves largely untouched the lack of transparency and external control of 
the established ways of doing things. The system of internal controls, 
however reinforced, remains vulnerable because it promotes tunnel vision 
and confirmation bias where it is not accompanied by institutionalized 
opportunities for dialogue – preferably including an outsider who can 
bring fresh insights and alternative hypotheses to bear. The obvious 
choice here is the defence lawyer, but not only does that seem almost 
impossible for the ‘insiders’ to contemplate, as yet Dutch lawyers lack the 
adversarial training that would make their presence effective. In the case 
of England and Wales, one can also point – in the recent blunt political 
and judicial rejection of any significant change to the function of appeals - 
to a continuing inability to see the one-shot trial as a vulnerability as 
opposed to a cultural strength. There is also a continuing failure to fully 
recognise the implications of the structurally inscribed implausibility of 
anything like equality of investigative arms and the evident defence 
difficulties in fulfilling the proactive investigative role that classical 
adversarial truth-finding assumes. So there is evidence in both 
jurisdictions of culturally conditioned reactions which limit the capacity to 
think in alternative terms.  
 But traditional ways of doing things are not immutable: modern 
criminal justice cultures are shifting things full of borrowings from 
elsewhere (Colson and Field 2016). Indeed, in both traditions, we see 
some readjustments that imply applying ideas more normally associated 
with the other tradition: defence prompting of the court in the inquisitorial 
tradition and judicial and police truth-finding duties in the adversarial. The 
analysis above suggests that there are arguments for ‘borrowing’ from 
the strengths of the other tradition. But that requires an examination of 
tensions created within mixed procedural practices by combining 
elements of both active state truth-finding and dialogue and debate 
between opposing parties. Otherwise there is a danger that a particular 
system might be caught between two competing logics without quite 
operationalizing either or reconciling the tensions between them. If, 
elements are to be introduced from the other tradition, such as an 
adversarial role for Dutch lawyers or an inquisitorial role for the English 
police, this must be done with an informed understanding of what those 
guarantees require to function properly. That requires comparative 
understanding not only of procedural rules but the institutions, traditions 
and formal and informal ways of thinking that shape the way they are 
applied in practice. This is one bilateral attempt to contribute to that 
understanding of different legal cultures.  
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